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q 201This paper explores the failure of anthropology, at least since the 1970s, to look at the big picture: what the four fields
can contribute to each other. It focuses on kinship as a key example, on other aspects of sociality, and on language
and symbolic thought. I argue that an understanding of humanity as a whole, and especially hunter-gatherers, is
important for grasping the nature of the human species. Cultural or social anthropology progressed to a large extent
through kinship studies, and it is here also that we should look. The transformation of a Ju/’hoan kinship structure to
a Khoe one is used as one key example. The deeper history of language itself is another. After these examples, I return
to general issues, including the ways in which the diverse branches of anthropology, especially social anthropology
and linguistic anthropology, serve to enlighten each other.My main point in this paper is very simple. All kinship sys-
tems possess similar attributes, the explanation of which re-
quires input from the entire range of anthropological sciences.
I include here prehistoric archaeology, biological anthropol-
ogy, anthropological linguistics, and social or cultural an-
thropology too. Related fields are implicated as well: evolu-
tionary psychology, cognitive science, and so on. That is why a
unified science of anthropology is useful, once we step beyond
ethnographic and human biological understandings toward
fully evolutionary ones. Of course, the timescale is often very
different between evolutionary anthropology and kinship stud-
ies. This is especially true where evolution implies changes
over millennia and kinship assumes social change over just a
few centuries. This paper will touch on both.
Let me take up general issues first, before returning to my
kinship examples and then to wider issues once again. If there
seems to be an emphasis on social or cultural anthropology
and on linguistic anthropology, that is because these are the
fields I know best. The interplay between them, at any level of
evolutionary development, could equally apply to the other
fields as well.
The Four-Field Approach and Understanding
Prehistory
I use the words “prehistory” and “prehistorian” in a very broad
sense, to include not only archaeologists but also anatomists,Barnard is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Social
ropology at the University of Edinburgh (15a George Square,
burgh, Scotland EH8 9LD, United Kingdom [a.barnard@ed.ac
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cial anthropologists who have a theoretical interest in prehis-
tory. Even to think about such issues entails a way of thinking
that is largely foreign to anthropology today. It is nevertheless
both necessary for anthropologists to do this and interesting
for the future of the discipline as a unified science.
I have not always been in favor of a four-field approach,
but in recent years I have come to the conclusion that such an
approach is best. Otherwise, it is too easy for biological an-
thropologists to retreat into concerns that leave them out of
touch with the richness of cultural diversity in the world and
for social (or cultural) anthropologists to remain ignorant of
advances in palaeoanatomy, neuroscience, genetics, and many
other fields that directly affect our perception of what it
means to be human. This is, after all, what anthropology in
its widest sense is meant to be all about. In particular, such
an approach is necessary to reunite anthropology with its
past as well as to stave off encroachment by social sciences
with different understandings of humanity. Of all the social
sciences, only anthropology is in a position to see the bigger
picture, and only with an eye to human biology is it in a
position to effect the changes in understanding that are
needed.
Human evolution has existed for far longer than humanity
as we know it. Humans have evolved through revolutionary
changes in social life, and these have both biological and
cultural foundations. How many cultural revolutions were
there? I would say three, four, maybe five or six, throughout
prehistory from Australopithecus to Homo sapiens sapiens.
Most certainly were both biological and cultural. And at least
one, if we include the Neolithic, was cultural alone. Only by
seeing human evolution from such a broad perspective can
we begin to understand the parts of anthropology that are my
main interest at present: notably, kinship and language. I seeserved. 0011-3204/2016/57S13-0013$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/686022
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quisition of symbolic thought and even the evolution of re-
ligious ideologies (see Ellis 2011; Wilson 2011).
Yet the steps entailed in this evolution are complicated.
Broadly, prehistorians (and especially the archaeologists
among them) fall into two camps. Either they believe in one
really big revolution, or they believe in no revolutions at all.
The actual number of revolutions does not matter as much as
the idea of searching for such revolutionary changes in so-
ciety, or for cultural advances, or, for that matter, for the
debates that can emerge from seeking them. An example of
an advocate of the “one-revolution” view is the social an-
thropologist Chris Knight. The clearest examples of the “no-
revolution” view are from archaeology. In particular, Sally
McBrearty and Alison Brooks, in a paper published in the
Journal of Human Evolution (McBrearty and Brooks 2000),
argue that both the fossil record and the stone-tool evidence
point to a gradual development of H. sapiens and the
H. sapiens brain.
Knight, in Blood Relations (1991) and in many articles
since (see, e.g., Knight 2010; Knight, Power, and Watts 1995),
has argued on the basis of cultural evidence that there was
one revolution. This was a revolution of the sort that Mc-
Brearty and Brooks refer to as “the revolution that wasn’t.” Its
date has changed through the years, but basically, to Knight it
is a revolutionary overthrow of patriarchy and of hierarchy
in general, which is now believed to have occurred perhaps
130,000 years ago. It may have been earlier, or it may have
been later, but from about that (very approximate) date we
have modern humans and modern, symbolic culture, with at
least primitive language. Language is important here, since it
marks the ability of humans to formulate religious ideas. In
Knight’s view, the earliest symbolism preceded language, and
language followed from symbolic thought. The first symbolic
revolution, according to Knight, was one of deliberate men-
strual synchrony and the control of male authority by this
female act. Clearly, Knight’s vision comes from social an-
thropology, but it has implications for other anthropological
sciences too.
Archaeologist Clive Gamble’s book Settling the Earth
(2013) deals in part with the ubiquitousness of three-stage
theory. It is also a book that combines a biological interest in
brain expansion with a sociohistorical interest in population
increase and dispersal. In an earlier book, Origins and Revo-
lutions, Gamble (2007) argues that neither the symbolic rev-
olution nor the Neolithic revolution really occurred. Instead,
he sees human cultural evolution, or rather material cultural
evolution, in terms of a gradual shift from an emphasis on
implements (e.g., stone axes) to an emphasis on containers.
According to Gamble, such items of material culture have
been important symbolically and apparently also in terms of
identity, that is, through the ability to carry more things.
Gamble has already crossed the boundaries that conven-
tionally separate different branches of anthropology. Yet he
has done so by venturing into areas where few have the ex-This content downloaded from 129.215
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book, Timewalkers (1993), he explores these by asking ques-
tions such as “How many species?” (53), “Why Africa?” (74),
“Where and how does speciation take place?” (74), “Can you
force hominids to change their ways?” (89), “What is hunt-
ing?” (117), and “What happened to the Neanderthals?”
(144). The style may be rhetorical, but these questions hint at
difficult but real issues that anthropologists rarely seem keen
either to examine or to debate.
So we have revolutionaries, such as Knight, and we have
gradualists, such as McBrearty, Brooks, and Gamble. My
own model lies roughly, if I can put it this way, in between.
I do believe in revolutions but would emphasize their plu-
rality. I accept the idea of a punctuated equilibrium, with
a degree of gradualism too. Nineteenth-century polymath
John Ferguson McLennan explained it this way; his main
concern here is with whether individuals or groups make up
societies:.18
ndAll the evidence we have goes to show that men were from
the beginning gregarious. The geological record distinctly
exhibits them in groups—naked hunters or feeders upon
shell fish leading a precarious life of squalid misery. This
testimony is confirmed by all history. We hear nothing in
the most ancient times of individuals except as being mem-
bers of groups. The history of property is the history of the
development of proprietary rights inside groups, which were
at first the only owners, and of all other personal rights—
even including the right in offspring—it may be said that
their history is that of the gradual assertion of the claims of
individuals against the traditional rights of groups. (Mc-
Lennan 1970 [1865]:162)In other words, the first property owners were not individ-
uals, but groups. Ownership progressed through “history,” or
what would soon (following Lubbock 1865) be known as
“prehistory.” We have an ever-increasing assertion of rights
by the individual against the group. There does remain, though,
the question of rights not merely in material things or in
people but also in knowledge. I-language aside (language for
thought, as opposed to for communication), language could
only ever be the property of a group. After knowledge of how
to make artifacts comes a means to transmit this knowledge, in
other words, language for communication. A recognition of
“ownership” is also implied here, and both ownership and the
socialist and individualist tendencies that define it result from
increasing group size, changes in the ability to communicate
over distance, global migrations, and the expansion (and col-
lapse) of kinship structures.
In short, most everything is implicated, and material, so-
cial, and kin relations are interrelated. This is the premise I
started with when I began to think about the origins of
language, and what led eventually to the conclusion that sev-
eral leaps were necessary in the evolution of language.4.062 on August 09, 2016 07:22:22 AM
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Social and cultural evolution rest in the development of
kinship, and possibly its future does as well (see Lévi-Strauss
1966). My own theory of the coevolution of kinship and
language was presented in two earlier papers (Barnard 2008,
2009). Let me outline the theory very briefly, but without all
the arguments for it or all the biological or linguistic tech-
nicalities. The biological and social basis of humanity lies in
Homo sapiens hunter-gatherer society as this existed at the
dawn of language and of symbolic thought. It is, of course,
from the earliest symbolic representations that human society
in general evolved, and understanding this evolution is cru-
cial to knowing the nature of humanity.
It is known that with increasing neocortex size came
changes in cognitive abilities and an increase in the optimal,
and actual, size of social groups (Aiello and Dunbar 1993).
The size of neocortex, and in fact of the brain as a whole,
correlates quite exactly with observed group size for all
primates, though certainly with caveats for Homo sapiens.
Homo sapiens’s “natural” group size is, or should be, about
150—known sometimes as “Dunbar’s number.” We would
assume that fossil hominins fitted these patterns, although
the presence of language, of course, enables humans to form
larger units than might otherwise have been the case. Ac-
cording to Robin Dunbar’s (2003) calculations, we would
expect australopithecines to have lived in groups of 65 or 70,
Homo habilis in groups of 75 or 80, Homo erectus perhaps
110, Homo heidelbergensis or so-called archaic H. sapiens 120
or 130, with modern H. sapiens about 150. Of course, other
physical factors also play a part: ecological relations, for ex-
ample.
My notion of three kinship revolutions is based essen-
tially on linguist Derek Bickerton’s (Calvin and Bickerton
2000:129, 136–137) notion of three stages of language: pro-
tolanguage, rudimentary language, and full language (see
fig. 1). These map neatly onto three stages in the evolution of
social and especially kinship structures. Protokinship in-
volved the sharing of food, sharing of ideas, and sharing of
techniques of toolmaking within groups. Rudimentary kin-
ship involved exchanges, possibly of people as well as things,
between groups. And full kinship involved the evolution of
more precise rules for sharing and exchange.
In earlier books and papers, Bickerton (e.g., 1990:177–181)
had argued against a gradual development of language and
instead for a catastrophic birth of language. This coincided
with the “cognitive explosion” that I refer to as the “symbolic
revolution.” Yet his later model (with neuroscientist William
Calvin) suggests the three phases described here. Protolan-
guage contains words and phrases but as yet no sentences.
The later simple sentences and the rudimentary-language
phase that characterizes their formation are products of
protolanguage plus a specific knowledge of such things as
who is grooming whom or who is in dispute with whom.
Full language entails complex syntax, including, for example,This content downloaded from 129.215
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able that in the first instance some form of linguistic com-
munication was signed rather than spoken (Arbib 2012;
Corballis 2002) and that from this language as we know it
eventually emerged.
What I have called the “signifying revolution” marks a
stage at which hominins are capable of using words and
therefore classifying things. I see this as a phase very loosely
reminiscent of Lewis Henry Morgan’s (1871:448–466) notion
of the earliest human society and the developments toward
what is today called the “Hawaiian” classification. For Mor-
gan, the earliest societies were characterized by promiscuous
sexual intercourse, with later refinements including the co-
habitation of brothers and sisters, the sharing of spouses in
common, and ultimately the “Hawaiian” form of classifica-
tion. I have suggested that this revolution occurred at an early
time of the genus Homo. At first, there may have been an
incest taboo, or there may not have been one. We do not
know for certain when the incest taboo emerged. Relation-
ship terms to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate mates or
terms to indicate generation or collateral distance may have
been yet to evolve. Yet the recognition of various relation-
ships should logically follow from the earliest use of proto-
language. The ability to classify is one step away from the
ability to name; it would thus accompany the early use of
common nouns. This could indeed mark a very early use of
language, and the development of relationship terminologies
and therefore of an incest taboo may be implicated.
If the first phase of language and kinship is perhaps at least
vaguely reminiscent of Morgan’s era of primitive promiscu-
ity, the second phase, following what I have called the “syn-
tactic revolution,” for me resembles McLennan’s (1970 [1865])
theory of the dawn of exogamy. McLennan believed that a
shortage of food led to female infanticide, which in turn led to
a shortage of women and then to polyandry as the norm.
Each woman would be married to more than one man, and
therefore the genitor of any child would be difficult to de-
termine. Descent was matrilineal, but this changed when men
adopted the practice of bride capture. They began to steal
wives from other tribes and thus gained control of their own
wives and families. The battles that ensued led, in turn, to a
desire for peace. Peace came as an exchange of women that
replaced the practice of bride capture, and this led in turn to
patrilineality and patriarchy. At least, this is how McLennan
saw it. The details of an actual transition here are lost in time,
although there does remain an implicit concern with property
and with groups.
Nevertheless, the signifying revolution brought the recog-
nition of categories such as mother (and possibly father),
brother, sister, son, daughter, and mate. The syntactic revo-
lution brought much more. With rudimentary syntax comes
the ability to formulate complex kin descriptions and there-
fore perhaps the recognition of mothers’ brothers and moth-
ers’ sisters. If Dunbar (2003) is right that H. heidelbergensis
group size had increased to 120, we could certainly imagine.184.062 on August 09, 2016 07:22:22 AM
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and with other groups. The increase in neocortex size sug-
gests a level of intentionality and the transmission of knowl-
edge about resources, populations, and kinship. Dunbar has
suggested that the earliest “archaic” H. sapiens or H. heidel-
bergensis, along with Neanderthals, probably filled a “bond-
ing gap.” They did this through the development of so-
phisticated communication through chorusing, and possibly
dance, before the development of full language. At this stage,
we would anticipate, too, the strong possibility of rules gov-
erning mating exogamy, although not yet its full fruition as
part of a typical hunter-gatherer social structure. A social
structure in which everyone is classified as some kind of “kin”
is the norm for hunter-gatherers. Yet this development would
have to wait until the complete development of symbolic
thought and what I have (again, loosely) referred to as a “full”
kinship system.
The symbolic revolution was, in a sense, Lévi-Straussian:
true kinship coincides with the emergence of elementary
structures (Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949]) and universal kin clas-
sification (Barnard 1978). Virtually all hunter-gatherer soci-
eties today also have universal kinship systems. Any strangers
who might have cause to engage in marital alliance, or pos-
sibly even the trade of material goods, would be fitted into kin
relations. Since society itself is definable entirely on a kinship
basis, everyone must belong to a kin category in relation to
anyone else: this is what universal kinship is. What makes a
language a full language is its use of complex syntax andThis content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aagreement between subject and verb. What makes a kinship
system a full kinship system is essentially that it recognizes a
distinction between a possible and a prohibited mate. It will
also, on both sides of the family, classify relatives according to
rules of agreement. If I call someone “son,” he calls me “fa-
ther,” and so on (see Tax 1955 [1937]:29). Just as no one
speaks half a language, so too no one can live in a society in
which there is only half a kinship system or in which people
play by different rules. Kinship systems, like languages, evolve
and must reach a point where they become fully formed. Of
course, people have through kinship virtually always been
able to manipulate categories, but that is not the point. The
crucial thing is that kinship evolved, and it evolved in a se-
quence at least approximately according to a scenario like
this.
Beyond what I have defined as a third phase, we have, in a
sense, a fourth. This is the phase of modernity, when both
elementary structures and universal kinship break down and
hunter-gatherer society gives way to the Neolithic.The Naro Kinship Terminology
Let me now take the formation of the Naro kinship system as
my key example of social change in action. Of course, this
does not represent evolution on the scale of that of hominins
in general, but it does show an example of the ways in which
different subdisciplines in anthropology can shed light on theFigure 1. The coevolution of language and kinship; adapted from Barnard (2011:133)..184.062 on August 09, 2016 07:22:22 AM
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represents the origin of language in the abstract in the distant
past, this next one on rapid social change represents the
origin of a language in recent history.
The Naro are a traditionally hunting-and-gathering people
of western Botswana and eastern Namibia. They are also
known as Nharo or Naron, and they number about 14,000. I
did field research with the Naro beginning in 1974, and this
section of the article is based on my early work as well as on
the recent discovery of a language shift and its implications
for reinterpreting Naro kinship and social structure.
The land of the Naro is adjacent to that of the more fa-
mous Ju/’hoansi (!Kung), who live to the north. The Naro
and Ju/’hoan languages are unrelated, and the kinship termi-
nology structures are very, very different: Naro makes parallel/
cross distinctions, and Ju/’hoan makes lineal/collateral distinc-
tions. However, the two terminologies share a rare feature: a
naming system in which namesakes are considered “grand-
relatives.” This enables universal kin categorization through
rules of namesake equivalence. For example, my sister’s name-
sake is classified as my “sister,” and the incest taboo is extended
through such equivalences. The two languages also seem to
share a word for “grandrelative” but little other vocabulary and
no grammatical features worth mentioning here. The cultural
similarities otherwise are also few, though significant: the ex-
istence of xaro (hxaro), for example, and of the custom of what
are arguably bridewealth and childbirth prestations, known as
kamane in Naro or kamasi in Ju/’hoan—though not in all
dialects. The last syllable each case, -ne or -si, is simply a plu-
ral suffix. Neither or these two words occurs generally among
San or Bushman groups, and indeed kamasi may be a loan
word, and the customs surrounding this institution may have
been introduced from the outside. Xaro is the formalized gift-
giving exchange system described by Polly Wiessner (e.g.,
1982). It overlies a network of rights to use resources on the
land of other xaro partners. In Naro it is known by the verbal
form, which is //’ãe.
In the past, I regarded Naro kinship as essentially a sim-
plified Khoe or Khoe-Kwadi (their language family) kinship
system with some Ju/’hoan or Kx’a (their language family)
features. Khoe-Kwadi and Kx’a are separate Khoisan lan-
guage families, not genetically related but part of a Sprach-
bund: a language area that came into being by convergence
rather than divergence. Khoe-Kwadi has only relatively re-
cently become regarded as a distinct language family, and the
notion of a single Khoisan family of some 300,000 speakers
and about 30 living languages has long since been discredited
(see Vossen 2013). Yet, as I have hinted above, the Naro very
likely once spoke a Kx’a language and shifted from it to what
eventually became Naro (Pickrell et al. 2012). The findings
here are based on both linguistic and genetic evidence. The
former include, for example, the presence of pharyngialized
vowels and compound verbs in Naro, though not in other
Khoe languages (see Güldemann 2008:122–123). The pros-
pect of accounting for such a transition at first frightened me,This content downloaded from 129.215
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it may seem.
I once published an essay on the “conjectural history” of
Khoisan kinship and presumed it to be definitive (Barnard
1988). However, it is worth thinking again about the transi-
tion the Naro must have made to such a different kinship
structure. This is not to reject anything I have written in the
past but rather to give it a different twist. We need to think
through that transition in light of the now fairly clear lan-
guage shift. Further technical detail has been published in a
recent article about this language shift (Barnard 2014), but
here let us consider simply the meaning of it for the people
who lived through the period. This shift, of course, has
evolutionary implications. The interesting thing is that these
implications are relevant to and borrow from the several
fields of anthropology. The exact time depth of contact and
transition is not easy to ascertain, but let us assume that it was
not long after the arrival of Khoekhoe in southern Africa, some
2,000 years ago. The present-day populations presumably
have been living in their present locations for about or near
that length of time. Contrary to popular myth, hunter-gatherer
groups, at least in southern Africa, are fairly stable in location.
Let us assume further that the present naming system of
the Ju/’hoansi was then in existence more or less as it exists
now. Given the present-day linguistic obscurity of the mean-
ing of the names themselves, or at least most of them, this is
quite likely. And it is plain that the Naro kinship system today
is very much a cross between the two systems: it has elements
of both. Basically, Naro has Ju/’hoan naming rules but a sim-
plified Khoe kinship structure. The latter works because of
the equivalence of alternate generations. Finally, let us assume
the stability of the kinship systems before the language shift.
This is also very likely in view of the known stability of all the
Khoisan systems, including both the terms themselves and the
structures. The structures of the known kinship systems are all
as expected: there are Ju/’hoan-like (lineal/collateral) distinc-
tions in the case of all Kx’a groups and Naro-like (parallel/
cross) distinctions in the case of all Khoe-speaking groups.
This is in spite of more than 1,000 years of language separation
for the Khoe speakers. We know this because of sound shifts in
words, especially for herding culture, among them “cow,”
“sheep,” and “milk.”
All these systems make a distinction between “joking”
relatives and “avoidance” relatives, and this is absolute: for
example, same-sex siblings and terminological equivalents are
joking, and opposite-sex siblings and terminological equiv-
alents are avoidance. The distinction is mainly for regulating
the incest taboo and for quasi-incest regulation, such as de-
termining how close one may sit next to someone of the op-
posite sex. There is no in-between status; one is either my
joking relative or my avoidance relative: everyone is either one
or the other, although the intensity of actual joking or avoid-
ance behavior does depend on a number of factors: age, actual
relationship (mother-in-law/son-in-law is the strongest avoid-
ance relationship), and so on..184.062 on August 09, 2016 07:22:22 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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classification (Barnard 1978). This means that anyone in such
a society will classify everyone they meet according to kin
category. The category non-kin literally does not exist, and
therefore it is important for people to know how to classify
everyone in the entire society. This works through personal
names, and even anthropologists are given such names in
order to fit them into the system, whether it be Ju/’hoan or
Naro. My Naro name happens to be !A/e, and anyone else
who possesses this name is my “grandrelative.” The name !A/e
occurs in both Ju/’hoan and Naro. The term for grandrelative
designates grandrelatives among both Ju/’hoan and Naro, al-
though the word is different. It is !u n!ã’a (masculine) or txũ
ma (feminine) in Ju/’hoan (see Marshall 1957, 1976:201–251).
Unusually, the equivalent word in Naro is not a Khoe word.
It is tsxõo or mama, which, with additional number-gender
suffixes, also means cross-cousin and cross-uncle or cross-
aunt. The two terms are in essence synonymous, though gram-
matically different (tsxõo takes both a prefix, such as “my,”
“your,” or “her,” and a number-gender suffix, but mama does
not take a prefix).
The full set of terms in Naro, without prefixes or suffixes, is
as follows:mama, tsxõo Grandparent, cross-uncle, cross-aunt, cross-cousin,
cross-nephew, cross-niece, grandchild, namesake,
spouse’s namesake, spouse’s joking relativetsxõo-/oa Cross-nephew, cross-niece, grandchild
//õo Parent, parent’s same-sex sibling, adult child
ao My father (no prefix)
ai My mother (no prefix)
sao Someone else’s parent
ki Elder sibling (real or classificatory)
!õe Younger sibling (real or classificatory)
khoe Spouse, spouse’s same-sex sibling (who is also mama
and tsxõo)
kx’ao Husband, sister’s husband (woman speaking) (who is
also mama and tsxõo)
g//ae Wife, brother’s wife (man speaking) (who is also mama
and tsxõo)
/’ui Sibling-in-law, spouse’s avoidance relativeAs it happens, the Naro structure is ideally suited to the
naming system, since grandrelative terms are the same as
cross-uncle/cross-aunt terms. This means that it will not matter
whether one is named for a second-ascending-generation rel-
ative or a first-ascending-generation relative: the terms are the
same.The Ju/’hoan Kinship Terminology
However, among the Ju/’hoansi it does matter. Names in
both societies ideally pass from grandparent to grandchild,
and names are gender specific. In Naro the terms for grand-
parent and cross-uncle or cross-aunt are identical, but in
Ju/’hoan the terms for uncle and aunt are tsu and g//a, re-This content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aspectively. Among the Ju/’hoansi when one runs out of
names for grandparents, one has to name a child after an
uncle or an aunt. Therefore, since the names are what are
truly important, the structure of the kinship terminology
changes when that happens. Ju/’hoan grandparents become
uncles and aunts, and uncles and aunts become grandparents.
It is this that caused the Marshall family such confusion when
they began their research on Ju/’hoan kinship. The Ju/’hoansi,
in other words, have two different terminology structures: one
for when a child takes his or her grandparent’s name, and
another for when he or she bears the name of an uncle or aunt.
The basic structure, when ego bears the name of a grand-
parent, looks like this:!u n!ã’a.184.062 on Augus
nd Conditions (httpGrandfather, cousin (M), grandson, namesake,
grandfather’s namesake, spouse’s joking relativetxũ ma Grandmother, cousin (F), granddaughter, namesake,
grandmother’s namesake, spouse’s joking relativetsu Uncle
g//a Aunt
mba Father
tae Mother
!ui Elder sibling
tsi Younger sibling
!ha Son
≠xae DaughterAlso important is the so-called wi relationship. In this, when
classifications might otherwise conflict, it is the older person
who classifies the younger.
The alternative structure occurs if ego bears the name of an
uncle or an aunt: the uncles and aunts on the side of the
family where his or her name comes from are called by the
grandrelative terms, and not uncle or aunt. Thus, the first
ascending generation on that side are the “grandparents,” the
“cousins,” and the “grandchildren” (these are equivalent
statuses), while the second ascending generation are the
“uncles” and “aunts” and the “nephews” and “nieces.” Ter-
minologically then, the generations are reversed, though only
on that side of the family. My father’s brother or my father’s
sister is my “grandparent” if I am named after him or her,
and my grandparents are my “uncles” and “aunts.” In my
own generation, I have terminological “uncles” and “aunts”
rather than cousins. The other side of my family remains
unchanged for me—although not necessarily for my siblings:
they might bear the names of our parents’ siblings and be
classified accordingly. As one might imagine, this caused the
Marshalls some confusion, as indeed it may do for Ju/’hoan
children too.The Transition
What can we say about the transition? For a start, it appears
to have been one-way: the ancestors of the Naro originally, or
at least very long ago, spoke a Kx’a language and subse-
quently acquired the Khoe language we now know as Naro.t 09, 2016 07:22:22 AM
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caused it in this case? My answer is simple but straightfor-
ward.
1. We must stop thinking about “the Naro” as a population
resembling that of the 14,000 or so Naro alive today. The
population was undoubtedly very much smaller, as indeed
was the rather larger Ju/’hoan population.
2. We must not assume that just one language was present.
In reality, there may have been many languages spoken in
a linguistically complex community that solidified as “the
Naro” and “the Ju/’hoansi” only in more recent times. Even
here, there is evidence of much earlier borrowing from a
Kx’a source to Khoe, as well as the later shift from Kx’a in
the Naro branch of the Kxoe subfamily (Güldemann,
forthcoming).
3. We know that language determines kinship structure, not
the other way around. While doing fieldwork in 2011, in
fact, I met a N!aqriaxe individual who could speak lan-
guages in five different language families. Although this
skill is unusual, it does hint at the possibilities long ago,
especially, though not uniquely, among hunter-gatherers
living in relatively small communities. N!aqriaxe, the only
Kx’a language spoken in southern Botswana, is a linguistic
isolate. It has fewer than 50 speakers in total, all of whom
are over 60 years of age. It is surrounded by speakers of
G/ui and G//ana (Khoe-Kwadi family), Taa (Tuu family),
Tswana (Bantu family), and, as a second language, Afri-
kaans (Indo-European family). Naturally, his children,
brought up speaking other languages, have acquired and
operate in other kinship systems: those of the adjacent
languages.
4. Of course, with so many languages around, as undoubt-
edly there must have been, it is unlikely that spouses al-
ways both spoke the same language, at least as native
speakers. Moreover, it stands to reason that it is extremely
unlikely that having just one language was the norm. Much
more likely is that everyone spoke several languages. This
is the norm among hunter-gatherers worldwide, both
today and in the recent past. For example, the N!aqriaxe
man mentioned above probably speaks some eight lan-
guages—although I do not know that for certain.
5. This being the case, it is possible that elements of more
than one kinship system were present at the same time or
that individuals operated within whichever system was
governed by the language they were speaking. This hap-
pens in Australia, for example (see, e.g., Maddock 1972).
When children acquire a new language, they take the
kinship system that goes with it.
6. However, it is in the nature of kinship systems that they
are “regular.” No one speaks half a language or has half a
kinship system. Often, if not always, pidgins quickly be-
come creoles (see McWhorter 2005), and in kinship what
Sol Tax (1955 [1937]:29) once called the “rule of uniform
reciprocals” dictates in one generation what happens inThis content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms athe next. If I call someone “son,” he will call me “father.” If
I call someone “sister’s son,” he will call me “mother’s
brother,” and so on. This may not always occur so neatly,
but normally it will be expected.
7. Putting all this together, we can assume that the very small
population was multilingual and that for some reason part
of the population diverged. The latter part of the popu-
lation acquired the Khoe language that came to be Naro,
and it allowed this language to become dominant. What
became the Naro language brought with it the Khoe
kinship structure but retained the Ju/’hoan naming cus-
toms as well as some cultural features, specifically the cus-
toms of //’ãe and kamane. This small group subsequently
abandoned the Ju/’hoan kinship system almost entirely,
and the system became Khoe.
Only one element of a Khoe system still exists: the terms
for grandparent and aunts and uncles are not Khoe but are
presumably derived from a Ju/’hoan, or at least a Kx’a, source.
These non-Khoe terms replace the Khoe word n//uri or n//odi,
in some languages today spelled //nuri (with appropriate
number-gender suffixes), which is otherwise found universally
among Khoe-speaking peoples. Of all the Khoe-speaking peo-
ples, only the Naro and their linguistic relatives the Ts’aokhoe
are missing this term. This includes the Khoekhoe herding
groups as well as the traditional hunter-gatherers and the
“River Bushmen” too: they all have it.
The differences between Naro and Ju/’hoan kinship struc-
tures are significant. Yet when seen in long, evolutionary
terms, they are not as problematic as it might seem. Other
parts of the world are also linguistically diverse, particularly
Australia and New Guinea. The island of New Guinea, for
example, has some 1,100 languages. Many are spoken by very
small populations: the mean number of speakers for a lan-
guage in Papua New Guinea is 3,752. A community may
number only 50 to a few hundred people, and a local group
may occupy a territory of just a few square miles (Nettle
1999:70–74). Given migration, cultural diffusion, and inter-
marriage, people will certainly be aware of each other’s
languages, and multilingualism is highly likely. The situation
is similar in Australia, where in 1770 (the time of first Eu-
ropean settlement) more than 200 languages were spoken.
The governor, Arthur Phillip, wrote to Sir Joseph Banks of his
astonishment that the inhabitants of Botany Bay were using
different words from people who lived only 40 miles away
(Dixon 1980:9–10).
Only by recognizing the genetic basis of the discovery that
“Naro” were once “Ju/’hoan”-like, the similarities in kinship
classification across the languages and language families
represented by these two groups, and the fact of the transition
from a tiny set of multilingual groups to larger and more
monolingual ones can we see the full picture. In other words,
Naro kinship can easily be understood, but only through a
broader framework than “the Naro kinship system” as we
have it today..184.062 on August 09, 2016 07:22:22 AM
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In North America, the four-field department is the norm. In
many other parts of the world, including the United King-
dom, where I am based, it is not. At the same time, in the
United Kingdom both students and professional anthro-
pologists blithely employ the term “anthropology” when they
really mean “social anthropology,” even in phrases like “an-
thropology differs in this regard from biological anthropol-
ogy” (which I have heard more than once). Only the former
is actually regarded as the real thing. In my course called
Human Origins and the Genesis of Symbolic Thought, I have
had many student essays with such a usage, even though the
first essay question was, in fact, “What are the barriers in
applying ideas from social anthropology to the study of hu-
man origins?” Plainly, some of the students had not gotten,
by that point, the idea of the course—nor, perhaps, of the
question itself (see also Barnard 2011, 2012).
Adam Kuper and Jonathan Marks (2011) commented a
few years ago on the lack of coherence in the anthropological
sciences. In the 1980s, departments in North America divided
into biological and social (or cultural) wings, with hardly
much interaction between them. In the spirit of journals such
as Current Anthropology and American Anthropologist, the
discipline must wake up to the fact that this larger discipline
is changing rapidly. This is borne out in biological anthropol-
ogy by publications such as Katherine MacKinnon’s (2014)
recent review of that subfield. She points out, for example, that
“hobbits,” Denisovans, and interbreeding with them and with
Neanderthals, as well as 400,000-year-old DNA, new fossils,
new stone tools, and so on, are all making this field quite ex-
citing. But where is social anthropology in this? Indeed, how
might social anthropologists in general explain the transition
from Ju/’hoan-like kinship to Naro-like kinship?
Within social anthropology (or linguistic anthropology),
Harold Conklin’s (1969:54–56) study of Hanunóo pronomial
usage is a classic case of this. In his analysis, Conklin replaces
the “traditional” distinctions of person (first, second, and
third), number (singular, dual, and plural), and inclusion (in-
clusive and exclusive) with three other pairs: minimal mem-
bership and nonminimal membership, inclusion of speaker
and exclusion of speaker, and inclusion of hearer and ex-
clusion of hearer. The result is an intrinsically satisfying ma-
trix along these axes, rather than a rather messy “solution”
with blank spaces where nonexistent pronouns “might” oc-
cur. Or imagine that if a kinship system has exactly 12 kin-
ship terms, being able to account for 9 or 10 of them is not
explaining the system. One needs the whole thing, because
that is what a system is.
Perhaps that is the crucial distinction between our disci-
pline and sociology: we seek answers that conform to local
realities. We are more interested in explaining systems than
in collecting data. This is not to suggest that there is neces-
sarily anything wrong with the idea of a comparative soci-
ology, but rather that anthropology does have its own, ratherThis content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms adifferent tradition. Anthropology as a whole seeks an un-
derstanding that is at least attempting to capture a truth that
our informants might broadly agree with. That is why we
seek explanations both from the inside and from the outside.
What the future holds will depend on how strong our an-
thropological tradition really is. For this, we as a discipline
should assert our independence from other social sciences as
well as our need for an anthropological foundation for our
findings (see also Parkin and Ulijaszek 2007). By “this,” of
course, I mean foundations within a wider framework de-
fined as anthropology in its broadest sense.Acknowledgments
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